Author and journalist Magnus Linklater was in the Chair, to introduce Max Hastings as someone who has a thorough grasp of the history of the Second World War and warfare in general.
Now with his book on "The Secret War" Hastings has broken new ground. But this is against a background of a great deal of scepticism as some authorities believe that only one thousandth of one per cent of intelligence has any value! This drew the immediate response from Hastings that this was an exaggerated figure and it came down to how leaders made use of the information available as to how useful and relevant it was.
Not for the last time did he mention the code breakers at Bletchley Park, for whom he had enormous admiration. He said that by breaking the German codes they knew about U-boat dispositions, about the Japanese fleet going to Midway, the dispositions of German tank formations at Arnhem and the build-up for the Ardennes offensive.
In some cases, it was that commanders simply did not want to believe the facts gleaned from intelligence.
The German Army was incredibly well trained and well led. So it did take time for the Allies to reach Berlin, and the German Army, even though they had sustained heavy losses, was still able to fight ferociously as it did around Arnhem.
In the case of Pearl Harbour, the American Navy was unwilling to accept intelligence showing that the USA was a target until late on. Similarly, the 1941 invasion of Russia by Germany was not countenanced by Stalin who thought the intelligence was wrong and misguided.
In the Ardennes, there was clear intelligence that the Germans were gathering for an offensive, yet the Allies were taken in by the German strategy of pleading lack of fuel and ammunition. Had this attack succeeded who knows what might have happened.
Hitler was paranoid about intelligence. He was deeply suspicious of anything he received which did not accord with his own views and knowledge. Here he differed greatly from Churchill, who never disputed information he received although appreciating that it might be inaccurate.
There was a total divergence in approach between Britain and Germany. In Germany, people like Enoch Powell would never have been promoted and the best brains were not used effectively to work in the field of intelligence. But the Soviet Union was much the same. There was plenty of high grade intelligence for Stalin to draw on, but he simply would not accept it. To some extent this was simply because Stalin could not trust people.
Max Hastings talked a little about the 'Red Orchestra' based in the UK at Cambridge, which produced some good intelligence for the Soviet Union. The trick was to spot the errors and to be selective.
Among the questions from the audience, was one about the British use of deception. Hastings said that it was impressive and the way in which the Germans were kept guessing until the last moment where the Allies were to land on D-Day was a very positive use of the element of surprise. However, it paled into insignificance when compared with the Soviet sacrifice of 77,000 soldiers during the defence of Stalingrad.
Another question: should you believe spies who have information or should you believe a code breaker? Hastings insisted that he would take a code breaker every time.
Max Hastings referred to Professor Sir Michael Howard, who in his writings has said that there are so many threats and personalities involved these days, that intelligence demand is rising fast and has to be a day-to-day affair. But Hastings said that we really need to appreciate how fortunate we are not to have had to fight in a major war for our country. He had great hopes that a major world war could be avoided in the future.
When asked if the Chinese should be allowed to finance the 3,200 MWe nuclear power station at Hinkley Point in Somerset, the answer was a clear 'no' as this would place us under an obligation to the Chinese and although the project is good for Anglo-Chinese relations we should not allow our nuclear power industry to be so controlled by China.
In summing up he said that it was clear that Germany failed to get value for their espionage during the last war as Hitler and his leadership did not want to see adverse intelligence. It was the British who made the better use of intelligence, although this was not always effective as in the Arnhem campaign. In Britain, even today there is better use of intelligence and its sources, while in the US there is a wave of general mistrust (particularly since Edward Snowden's revelations).
This was again a 'tour de force' by a highly knowledgeable man and deserves the highest rating. It was excellent.
Max Hastings is author of The Secret War
